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Within the long tradition of Christian reflection on the problem of evil, different approaches to 
justify God are developed. More specifically, this article focuses on the school of thought 
within evangelical theology known as “Open Theism” of which Gregory Boyd is one of the 
main exponents. Open theism is concerned with how God experiences the world. It asks and 
attempts to answer questions such as, “What does God know?” and “When does God know 
it?” The questions that open theists raise are not so much about how God knows the future, 
but if God knows it at all.  To absolve God from the responsibility of suffering induced by 
human beings, Open Theist portrays God as taking risks by allowing human freedom since 
God cannot know the future actions of free moral agents.  This article will examine the position 
adopted by Gregory Boyd2 on the theodicy problem as it relates to God’s foreknowledge. In 
this article, I shall ask whether Boyd’s approach may be regarded as a fruitful extrapolation 
of an understanding of divine foreknowledge within the evangelical tradition in relation to 
human suffering. 
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Introduction 
Throughout history, the church has always been challenged both philosophically and 
theologically by the problem of evil. In attempting to answer this challenge, many theodicies 
were developed. Two dominants theodicies that are modified slightly within the Evangelical3 
                                         
1 This article comes out of my second PhD done under the promotion of Prof E. Conrdie at UWC. 
2 Boyd is an evangelical pastor, Christian theologian and author. He is Senior Pastor of the Woodland 
Hills Church in St. Paul Minnesota, United States. Boyd graduated with a bachelor’s degree in 
Philosophy from the University of Minnesota, earned his master’s degree (cum laude) from Yale 
University Divinity School and a doctorate (magna cum laude) from Princeton Theological Seminary. 
He was Professor of Theology at Bethel University for sixteen years. Boyd’s was   Charles Hartshorne’s 
Process theology which Boyd considered “essentially correct” in the philosophical and theological 
understanding of the nature of God and the future. See Strobel (1998) A Case for Christ. 
3 The term Evangelical is a movement in modern Christianity that covers a diverse number of 
Protestant traditions, denominations, organizations, and churches. It originates in the Greek word 
euangelion, meaning “the good news,” or, more commonly, the “gospel.” During the Reformation, 
Martin Luther adapted the Latinised form of the term evangelium, dubbing his breakaway movement 
the evangelische kirche, or “evangelical church”—a name still generally applied to the Lutheran Church 
(See “Evangelicalism” in Elwell, 2001:405-409). In the English-speaking world, however, the modern 
term usually describes the religious movements and denominations which sprung forth from a series 
of revivals that swept the North Atlantic Anglo-American world in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries provides summary of Evangelical distinctive, identifying four primary characteristics of 
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tradition is that of St Augustine understanding of Free will or Soul Deciding Theodicy of which 
Alvin Plantinga is its modern proponent and Irenaeus’s Soul-Making or Person Making 
Theodicy of which the late John Hick was its most vocal spokesperson. However, it might be 
said that the Soul-Making Theodicy is a minority view held with Evangelicalism. Other minority 
views are also are held within Evangelicalism, e.g. Protest Theodicy developed by John Roth 
or Informed Consent Theodicy by Antony Haig.  However, it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to deal with every theodicy.    In this paper, I have deliberately limited the focus to the 
theodicies of St. Augustine and St. Irenaeus due to their dominance and long history within 
Evangelicalism over other theodicies.  Open theism is a theological development that seems 
to be gaining popularity within Evangelicalism will also be evaluated in light of the claim made 
by open theists that their understanding of God puts them in a better position to deal with the 
problem of evil than that of St. Augustine and St. Irenaeus. It is because of this claim of a 
“better position” that a review of open theism needs to be undertaken, by asking does this 
“better view resonate” with an Evangelical understanding of God and his nature. 
 
Responses the Problem of Evil within Evangelicalism 
 
Augustinian Theodicy  
 
St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) proposed a solution to the problem by blaming suffering 
on the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. From this perspective, humans 
are responsible for suffering by being led astray by Satan. For Augustine, God is the author 
of everything. He also believed the world had been created literally out of nothing (ex nihilo), 
according to the Divine will. This meant that as far as Augustine was concerned, everything 
in the world is created good or perfect. He also believed that, although there is an abundance 
of variety in the world, this is ordered in varying degrees, according to the fullness of a 
creature’s nature. This means that there is no totally evil thing in the world.  
For St. Augustine matter is something inherently good, but it is also something that can 
deviate from what it should be. Thus for St. Augustine, the notion of “evil”, must now be 
understood as the privatio boni (“privation of good”), or that which occurs when a person 
renounces their proper role in the order and structure of creation. In other words, something 
becomes “evil” when it ceases to be what it is meant to be. St. Augustine (in Confessions 
6.12 in NPNF Vol. II:101) further clarifies the relationship of privation to the good, by stating: 
Those things are good which yet are corrupted, which, neither were they 
supremely good, nor unless they were good, could be corrupted; because if 
supremely good, they were incorruptible, and if not good at all, there was 
nothing in them to be corrupted. For corruption harms, but, less it could 
diminish goodness, it could not harm. Either, then, corruption harms not, 
which cannot be; or, what is most certain, all which is corrupted is deprived 
of good. But if they be deprived of all good, they will cease to be. For if they 
be, and cannot be at all corrupted, they will become better, because they 
shall remain incorruptibly. And what more monstrous than to assert that those 
things which have lost all their goodness are made better? Therefore, if they 
shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer be. So long, therefore, as 
they are, they are good; therefore whatsoever is, is good. That evil, then, 
                                         
evangelicalism: Conversionism: the belief that lives need to be transformed through a “born-again” 
experience and a life- long process of following Jesus. Activism: the expression and demonstration of 
the gospel in missionary and social reform efforts. Biblicism: a high view for and obedience to the Bible 
as the ultimate authority. Crucicentrism: a stress on the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross as making 
possible the redemption of humanity. (See Bebington, 2006. The Dominance of Evangelicalism. 
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which I sought whence it was, is not any substance; for were it a substance, 
it would be good. For either, it would be an incorruptible substance, and so a 
chief good, or a corruptible substance, which unless it was good it could not 
be corrupted. I perceived, therefore, and it was made clear to me, that Thou 
made all things good, nor is there any substance at all that was not made by 
You; and because all that You have made are not equal, therefore all things 
are; because individually they are good, and altogether very good, because 
our God made all things very good  
  
Thus, if St. Augustine understood creation to be good, then this begs the question: Where 
then did evil originate? For St. Augustine, evil entered the world because of the wrong choices 
of free beings (free in the sense that there was no external force necessitating them to do 
wrong). In other words, corruption occurred because of the use of our free will. According to 
St. Augustine, (in The City of God 12.6 in NPNF Vol. II:229) when the will abandons what is 
above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil – not because that is evil to which it 
turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. This not only absolves God of creating evil but 
also allows Him to show the world His love by bringing Christ into the world. A modern 
advocate of St. Augustine’s view can be found in Alvin Plantinga (God, Freedom and Evil, 
1974), who claimed that for God to create a person who could only have performed good 
actions would have been logically impossible. 
St. Augustine’s theodicy is often associated with the supposed free will defence – which 
suggests that suffering is essentially a function of human freedom and therefore, God cannot 
be blamed for such suffering.  
Anthony Haig (2006), in summarising the free will view, states that the basis of free will 
theodicy is the claim that God created creatures who are genuinely free in some highly 
desirable sense, but who are also capable of choosing to be/do evil. It is argued that the good 
that comes from creating such genuinely free creatures outweighs the cost of the various 
evils that will result. 
 
 The Irenaean Theodicy 
St.  Irenaeus (130-202 CE) taught that the existence of evil serves a purpose. From his point 
of view, evil provides the necessary problems through which we take part in what Hick 
(1981:40) calls “person-making”. It follows that evil is a means to an end in the sense that, if 
it did not exist, there would be no means of spiritual development. So the foundational 
principle of the theodicy of Irenaeus is that we have been placed in a hostile environment to 
learn to become better people. Philosophers such as John Hick and Richard Swinburne have 
adopted the idea of Irenaeus in recent times. According to this view, the pains and sufferings 
of the world are used by God to serve as a method to build a truly good person. God could 
have created us perfect beings, but God is more interested in our choosing to become who 
God wants us to be (at some point), rather than forcing us to be this way (no matter how long 
this takes).  
Leibniz explained the reality of human suffering by saying that God allows it temporarily for 
the greater good (cited in Stumpf 1989:257). Leibniz, like Plato and St. Irenaeus, maintained 
that everything in the universe was explicable, and God must indeed create the best while 
allowing suffering temporarily for the greater good of his creation (cited in Stumpf 1989:64-
67). Another modern adherent to this position is Quinn. Quinn (1982:199-215), like Leibniz, 
argues that we cannot know the effect of removing certain evils in the world since we cannot 
see the world from an infinite perspective. Hick (1966), in his proposed “soul/person making” 
theodicy, views suffering not as evil but rather as a necessary stage in the development of a 
relatively immature creation into a more mature state. Following St. Irenaeus, Hick does not 
consider that suffering in the world is because of the fall from a once-perfect state but rather 
emphasises suffering as a process that will bring about a gradual improvement in the human 
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race. Hick (1981:25) sees humans as endowed with real but limited freedom that enables a 
relationship with God through which they can find fulfilment. This relationship gives meaning 
to our human existence “as long as the process, through which we are being created by our 
free responses to life’s combination of good and evil, ultimately leads to good”. The good that 
outshines all evil is not a paradise long since lost but a kingdom that is yet to come in its full 
glory and permanence.  
 
 Open Theism 
In recent years open theism has gained a degree of recognition and acceptance among some 
evangelical theologians and philosophers. Theologians in the school of open theism have 
argued that the classical definition of divine omniscience is seriously problematic for 
addressing the problem of evil and suffering. Hasker (1994:152) provides the following 
explanation:  
God knows that evils will occur, but God has not for the most part specifically 
decreed or incorporated into his plan the individual instances of evil. Rather, 
God governs the world according to general strategies which are, as a whole, 
ordered for the good of the creation but whose detailed consequences are 
not foreseen or intended by God prior to the decision to adopt them. As a 
result, we can abandon the difficult doctrine of "meticulous providence" and 
to admit the presence in the world of particular evils God's permission of 
which is not the means of bringing about any greater good or preventing any 
greater evil.  
 
Open theism derives its name from its view of the relationship between God and the future. 
On that view, God lacks exhaustive knowledge of the future; the future is thus “open” to him. 
Therefore, while God may have a good idea of what might happen, he does not know when 
it will happen. According to Boyd (2000:11), the future is “partly determined and foreknown 
by God, but also partially open and unknown by God as because Divine uncertainty of the 
future results from God’s decision to grant freedom to some of his creatures. On this Pinnock 
(1994:7) elaborates:  
God, in grace, grants humans significant freedom to cooperate with or work 
against God's will for their lives, and he enters into a dynamic, give and take 
relationship with us. The Christian life involves a genuine interaction between 
God and human beings. We respond to God gracious initiatives and God 
responses to our responses. 
 
The above statement is an acceptable explanation for God granting humans significant 
freedom within the evangelical tradition, but Pinnock goes on to explain that the freedom 
humans and how it relates to God's knowing seem to run counter to the evangelical view of 
God’s foreknowledge. He (1994:7) states:  
God takes risks in this give-and-take relationship, yet he is endlessly 
resourceful and competent in working towards his ultimate goals. Sometimes 
God alone decides how to accomplish these goals. On other occasions, God 
works with human decisions, adapting his plans to fit the changing situation. 
God does not control everything that happens. Rather, he is open to receiving 
input from his creatures. In loving dialogue, God invites us to participate with 
him to bring the future into being.  
 
Hasker (1994:139) argues that the openness model is “in a better position than Calvinism or 
Molinism” in dealing with the issues brought about by the problem of evil. In particular, it is 
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asserted that traditional Christian theism fails to vindicate God of guilt or responsibility for evil 
and should, therefore, be abandoned in favour of the attractive openness model of divine 
providence.  
Blount (2005:178) views the open theist understanding of God as a God who takes risks and 
adapts his/her plans for changing human situations. God’s doing so, results from the fact that 
God has created us as free creatures together with the assumption that God cannot know in 
advance what humans will freely do. Such an understanding of the divine nature stands in 
marked contrast to traditional theism, according to which God not only exhaustively knows 
the future, but also is timeless, immutable and passible rather than impassible, which leads 




Evangelicals understand God’s knowledge as being exhaustive. However, this thorough 
knowledge should not be seen as fatalism Helm (1993:218) states that fate suggests 
impersonality as in astrological beliefs, but providence is personal, the personal activity of 
God in his/her creation through which he/she brings to its appointed end or destiny. Fate may 
also suggest the interferences of the gods, whereas providence is the all-embracing rule of 
the one God. Thiessen (1996:81) elaborates: “God is infinite in knowledge. He knows himself 
and all other things perfectly from all eternity, whether they be actual or merely possible, 
whether they be past, present or future. He/She knows things immediately, simultaneously, 
exhaustively and truly” (See Figure 1).  
 
Image 1. God is infinite in knowledge 








God knows all true propositions 
The future is a true proposition 
Therefore, God knows the future. 
 
Grudem (1994:190), in keeping with this evangelical understanding, states that God fully 
knows all things actual and possible in one simple eternal act. Thus, the term omniscience 
designates God’s cognitive awareness. God has knowledge of all time: past, present and 
future. This knowledge includes even the future and free actions of human beings. However, 
omniscience should not be confused with causation. Free actions do not take place because 
they are foreknown, but are foreknown because they take place (Thiessen, 1996:82). Tozer 
(1978:62-63), in trying to explain the exhaustive knowledge of God, states that “God knows 
instantly and effortlessly all matter and all matters, all mind and every mind, all spirit and 
every spirit all being and every being, things visible and invisible in heaven and on earth, 
motion, space, time life death, good evil heaven and hell. Because God knows all things 
perfectly, he/she knows nothing better than any other thing, but all things equally well. God 
never discovers anything and is never surprised, never amazed. God never wonders about 
anything nor does s/he seek or ask questions”.  
 
The mode of God’s knowledge consists of God’s knowing all things perfectly, undivided, 
distinctly and immutably. This knowing is thus distinguished from human and angelic 
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knowledge because God knows all things by him/herself or by his/her essence (not by forms 
abstracted from things – as is the case with creatures – both because these are only in time 
with the things themselves, but the knowledge of God is eternal, and because God can have 
no cause outside of him/herself). Therefore, God’s knowledge of him/herself and creation is 
infinite. It is exhaustive of everything external and internal to God. Thus the knowledge of 
God is not gained or acquired but is because he/she knows all things. God’s knowledge or 
knowing thus is not perceived fragmentarily as humans perceive from the perspective of time; 
God knows exhaustively in eternal simultaneity. Bavinck (1977:187), following the argument 
of Aquinas, states that God is an eternal, pure being and God’s self-knowledge has for its 
content nothing less than full, eternal, divine essence. Being and knowing are one in God. 
God knows him/herself by means of his/her being. While God’s knowledge is not a gradual 
process of development, neither does God’s knowledge increase or decrease. For in God 
there is no process of becoming, no development or in the words of Aquinas, no potentiality 
because God is a perfect being. For if God knowledge is not exhaustive, then how could we 
hold that which he/she promises in the Scriptures to be true.  Charnock (1977: 322) states 
this even more clearly:  
 
If God were changeable in his knowledge, it would make him unfit to be an 
object of trust to any rational creature. His revelations would want the due 
ground for entertainment, if his understanding were changeable; for that 
might be revealed as truth now which might prove false hereafter, and that 
as false how which hereafter might prove true; and so God would be and unfit 
object of obedience in regard of his precepts, and an unfit object in regard of 
his promises. For if he is changeable in his knowledge, he is defective in 
knowledge and might promise that now which he would know afterwards was 
unfit to be promised, and, therefore, unfit to be performed. It would make him 
an incompetent object of dread, in regard to his threatenings; for he might 
threaten that now which he might know hereafter were not fit or just to be 
inflicted. A changeable mind and understanding cannot make a due and right 
judgment of things to be done, and things to be avoided; no wise man would 
judge it reasonable to trust a weak and flitting person. God needs be 
unchangeable in his knowledge; but as the schoolmen say, that, as the sun 
always shines, so God always knows; as the sun never ceaseth to shine, so 
God never ceaseth to know. Nothing can be hid from the vast compass of his 
understanding, no more than anything can shelter itself without the verge of 
his power.  
 
Helm (1993:169) identifies the evangelical understanding of the exhaustive knowledge of 
God as an extension of the classical tradition and theologians as diverse as Augustus Strong 




The denial of God’s omniscience by open theist provides a basis for the major lines of 
difference between open theism and Evangelicalism. This is done by the open theists appeal 
to Scripture that on the surface appear to limit God’s omniscience. These passages can be 
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grouped into two categories: Divine growth in knowledge4 and God’s repentance5. Thus open 
theists have raised serious biblical and theological objections against the traditional view of 
                                         
4 One of the initial appeals of open theism is that it challenges us to read the text of Scripture simply 
for what it says which at times is taken to be “literalistic”. It is evident that open theism brings to the 
study of biblical reading a fairly literal hermeneutic, including those passages that have traditionally 
been understood as anthropomorphic descriptions of God. Boyd (2000:60-72) speaks of interpreting 
this text straightforwardly and at face value.  Boyd (2000:54) states that open theism is rooted in the 
conviction that the passages that used to build up the motif of openness should be taken just as literally 
as the passages that constitute the motif of future determination. What Boyd infers is that this text 
ought to be taken just as it appears, as giving an exact description of God rather than being understood 
as anthropomorphic, anthropopathic or metaphorical. Thus, open theists offer an unusual hermeneutic 
as seen in the few examples discussed below. One of the key passages cited by Boyd is Genesis 
22:12 (NIV): “And he said, ‘Do not stretch out your hand against the lad, and do nothing for now I 
know you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from Me.” Boyd (2000:64) 
states that this verse has no clear explanation if God was certain that Abraham would fear him/her 
before he offered his son. To support his argument that God literally did not know what Abraham’s 
response would be until Abraham made it. Boyd (2000:54) insist that is God only literally learned what 
he/she had not known; this was a real test and God learned the results only when Abraham acted. 
Behind this insistence, is an underlying hermeneutics of a “straight forward” or “literal” or face value 
meaning as t One of the initial appeals of open theism is that it challenges us to read the text of 
Scripture simply for what it says which at times is taken to be “literalistic”. It is evident that open theism 
brings to the study of biblical reading a fairly literal hermeneutic, including those passages that have 
traditionally been understood as anthropomorphic descriptions of God. Boyd (2000:60-72) speaks of 
interpreting this text straightforwardly and at face value.  Boyd (2000:54) states that open theism is 
rooted in the conviction that the passages that used to build up the motif of openness should be taken 
just as literally as the passages that constitute the motif of future determination. What Boyd infers is 
that this text ought to be taken just as it appears, as giving an exact description of God rather than 
being understood as anthropomorphic, anthropopathic or metaphorical. Thus, open theists offer an 
unusual hermeneutic as seen in the few examples discussed below.  
One of the key passages cited by Boyd is Genesis 22:12 (NIV): “And he said, ‘Do not stretch out your 
hand against the lad, and do nothing for now I know you fear God, since you have not withheld your 
son, your only son, from Me.” Boyd (2000:64) states that this verse has no clear explanation if God 
was certain that Abraham would fear him/her before he offered his son. To support his argument that 
God literally did not know what Abraham’s response would be until Abraham made it. Boyd (2000:54) 
insist that is God only literally learned what he/she had not known; this was a real test and God learned 
the results only when Abraham acted. Behind this insistence, is the underlying hermeneutics of a 
“straight forward” or “literal” or face value meaning as the correct interpretation of these passages.  
Therefore, Boyd concludes that God learns (for now I know that you fear the Lord) the state of 
Abraham’s heart as he/she observes Abraham’s willingness to offer Isaac on the altar. When Abraham 
actually raised his knife, then only was God able to say, “now I know”. God learned something that 
he/she had not known before, and according to Boyd and other open theist this passage, like other 
so-called growth knowledge text, illustrates that God does not have exhaustive knowledge of the 
future. The correct interpretation of these passages.  Therefore, Boyd concludes that God learns (for 
now I know that you fear the Lord) the state of Abraham’s heart as he/she observes Abraham’s 
willingness to offer Isaac on the altar. When Abraham actually raised his knife, then only was God able 
to say, “now I know”. God learned something that he/she had not known before, and according to Boyd 
and other open theist this passage, like other so-called growth knowledge text, illustrates that God 
does not have exhaustive knowledge of the future. 
5 As discussed in the above section, a straightforward reading of particular texts also leads Boyd to 
conclude that God knowledge is limited, and that God grow in his/her knowledge as God engages with 
man. In a similar fashion, Boyd interprets divine repentance texts in a straightforward manner. Boyd 
(2005:56-57) writes “Now some may object that if God regretted a decision, he/she made, God then 
must not be perfectly wise. Wouldn’t God be admitting making mistakes? It is better to allow Scripture 
to inform us regarding the nature of divine wisdom than to reinterpret an entire motif in order to square 
it with our preconception of divine wisdom. If God says he/she regretted a decision, and if Scripture 
elsewhere tells us that God is perfectly wise, then we should simply conclude that God can be perfectly 
wise and still regret a decision “(italics added). 
Boyd tries to prove his case by undertaking a survey of biblical passages. Thomas (2001:189) states: 
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God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. Because God only knows that which is true (that is, the 
past and present), the future is not a reality and is therefore false and cannot be known to 
God. Even the possibilities are not known, because this is in the future. This then calls for 
engagement to take this proposal seriously and weigh the evidence. In this section, 
consideration will be given to the evidence that Boyd and other proponents of open theism 
offer for their denial of divine foreknowledge based on their understanding of the nature of 
time and the nature of the future.  Boyd (2000:122) argues that God cannot be a- temporal 
using Hartshorne A theory and B Theory of time, while the Evangelical view of complete 
divine knowledge coexists with a-temporal or the temporal view of God. 
 
With regards to the future Boyd (2000:17) states that the idea that God does not know the 
future is not a limitation on God omniscience because the future is not something knowable. 
Therefore, God cannot know the future because there is no future.  For Boyd (2000:15-16) 
the events of the future might or might not come to pass. This then presents us with a 
framework as to why Boyd understands that the future is not a reality and therefore cannot 
be known by God (See Figure 2 below). 
 
     Figure 2: The future is not a reality  














God knows only true propositions 
The future is not a true proposition 
Therefore, God cannot know the future 
   
Open Theism and the Problem of Evil 
One of the fundamental commitments of open theism is the rejection of God’s knowledge of 
the future and free actions of human beings. Tied very closely to this is God’s inability to 
control such future free actions including at times, some deeply tragic occurrences. So, while 
                                         
This technique seeks a larger picture in a passage before investigating the details. In fact, it disparages 
traditional methods that investigate the details first, before proceeding to the larger picture.” Thomas 
has coined the phrase “hermeneutical hopscotch” to describe the practice of hopping from one carefully 
selected part of a larger section of Scripture to another. By selecting only parts that support a 
predetermined opinion, this method can demonstrate just about anything the interpreter desires to 
prove. For instance, Boyd (2000:56) begins with Genesis 6:6, and says: “The Lord was sorry that he 
had made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart.” He then uses this to prove that God 
did not know in advance that humans would come to this wicked state and therefore regrets that he/she 
created humanity. 
Boyd’s interpretation of Exodus 32:14 – “So the Lord changed his/her mind about the harm which 
he/she said he/she would do to his/her people” – suggests that God was confronted with a previously 
unknown situation that resulted in God’s reassessing his/her decision about what he/she intended to 
do. 
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God feels the pain of our suffering, God is often unable to prevent it because God 
himself/herself did not know that it is going to occur. Thus. when evil occurs, we are not to 
blame God because he/she feels as badly about our suffering as we do. In the midst of 
suffering Christians can be comforted with the assurance that God had nothing to do with 
their suffering and that God’s disposition towards them is one of uncompromising love. 
Therefore, Hasker (1994:139) confidently argues that the openness model is in a better 
position than classical theism to deal with the issues raised by the problem of evil. Open 
theists take the problem extremely seriously, and they believe they address it more 
satisfactorily than do traditional theists.  
Hasker (1989:191-201) argues at length that open theism handles the problem of sin far 
better than the traditional way of viewing sin. In particular, that traditional Christian theism 
fails to absolve God of guilt or responsibility for evil and should, therefore, must be abandoned 
in favour of the attractive openness model of divine providence.  
According to open theists, the problem originates with the initial sin of Adam – a view that 
most Evangelicals are in agreement. Furthermore, Hasker argues that God’s lack of control 
over human actions makes him/her a risk taker. Boyd (2001:23) agrees that when God 
created human beings with free will, he/she took a risk because creatures will not necessarily 
choose what God wants. However, God values human freedom so much that he/she has 
placed it beyond even God’s ability to curtail, despite his/her foreknowledge and relationship 
with the future. Griffin (2004:292) ties the expression of value to the degree of freedom when 
he writes that “no significant degree of intrinsic value would be possible without a significant 
degree of freedom”. 
 
Regarding this idea of freedom, Boyd opens his book God at War with the story of Zosia, a 
child tortured and killed by Nazis in front of her mother. Viewing her experience through the 
words of the hymn, My Times Are in Thy Hand by W.F. Loyd, Boyd (1997:38-39) writes: 
 
Again, if we have the courage to allow the antinomy between the lyrics of this 
hymn and Zosia’s tortured screams to engage us on a concrete level, the 
antinomy borders on the unbearable. What does it mean to assert that the 
hand of the all-powerful and all-loving Father “will never cause his child a 
needless tear” when asserted in the vicinity of a child who has just had her 
eyes plucked out and of the screams of Zosia’s terrorised mother? In this 
concrete context, does it not suggest that this event came from the hand of 
God and that it came about “as best as it seemed to thee”, come close to 
depicting God on Hitlerian terms? What is more, would not such a conception 
significantly undermine the godly urgency one should have to confront such 
evil as something that God is unequivocally against? The Nazis’ agenda 
somehow here seems to receive divine approval. Yet while we are to view the 
Nazis’ agenda as being diabolically evil, we are apparently supposed to accept 
that God’s agenda in ordaining or allowing the Nazis’ behaviour is perfectly 
good. 
  
Further to this, Boyd argues that the Bible was written from the perspective of a “warfare 
worldview”. As Boyd (1997:20) describes it, this world-view: 
 
Is predicated on the assumption that divine goodness does not completely 
control or in any sense will evil; rather, good and evil are at war with one 
another. This assumption entails that God is not now exercising exhaustive, 
meticulous control over the world. In this worldview, God must work with, and 
battle against, other created beings. While none of these beings can ever 
match God's power, each has some degree of genuine influence within the 
cosmos. In other words, a warfare worldview is inherently pluralistic. There is 
no single, all-determinative divine will that coercively steers all things, and 
hence there is here no supposition that evil agents and events have a secret 
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divine motive behind them. Hence too, one needs not agonise over what is 
ultimately good. The transcendent divine purpose might be served by any 
particular evil event.  
 
Unfortunately, statements such as this imply, according to Payne and Spencer (2001:267), 
that God is not able to prevent evil events from happening, a conclusion that does little to 
reinforce one’s hope for the future. Open theists, however, scoff at this conclusion, for they 
believe that God can intervene. As a result, they claim that God will surely overcome his/her 
enemies in the eschaton. As Boyd (1997:287) writes, “hence the ability of any within the 
angelic or human society of God’s creation to rebel freely against God shall someday come 
to an end”. Boyd (2001:14-15) also argues that it is impossible that a good and loving God 
can allow evil to prevail and that God cannot bring about good from that which is evil. Boyd 
(2001:430) thus develops the term “warfare theodicy” as: 
 
The understanding of evil that follows from a Trinitarian warfare worldview 
argues that the scope and intensity of suffering we experience in the world are 
not adequately accounted for when viewed against the backdrop of a cosmic 
war between God and Satan. Much evil in the world is the crossfire of this age-
long (but not eternal) cosmic battle. It is in most cases futile; therefore, to search 
for divine reasons for some episodes of suffering, though God will always work 
with his/her people to bring good out of evil, often with such effectiveness that it 
may seem that the evil was planned all along. The reason why God created a 
world in which a cosmic war could break out is articulated in the six theses that 
structure the Trinitarian warfare theodicy.  
  
Therefore, the answer to the problem of evil for Boyd (2001:16) “lies in the nature of love”. 
God created the world for the sake of love to establish a loving relationship with humanity. 
Because of this God created human beings with the capacity to love, but also with the 
capacity to withhold love as well. Therefore, Boyd (2001:14) asserts that it is not reasonably 
possible to create creatures with the ability to love without risking the possibility of great evil. 
Boyd develops this in six theses: 
 Love must be chosen 
Boyd (2001:53) argues that the very nature of love requires that it either be chosen or 
rejected. To demonstrate this, Boyd (2001:55) uses the example of a man who implants a 
computer chip in his wife’s brain to make her always do loving things. He (2001:59) asks if 
the actions of the wife would be considered genuine love. Boyd concludes that the action 
cannot be out of love because her “love” is caused by external forces not chosen freely. Thus, 
being free to choose is the final cause of and an explanation for the problem of evil: therefore. 
God is not to blame. 
 Freedom implies risk 
If love implies choice and human beings are the final cause of their actions, God took a risk 
when he/she created such beings. According to Boyd (2001:86), this requires one to believe 
that the actions and decisions of God are based on ignorance. Since human beings are the 
ultimate creators of their actions, not even God can know their actions in advance. Hence, 
we cannot blame God for the evil that breaks loose and creates suffering in the world he/she 
has created. 
 Risk entails moral responsibilities 
When God bestows on human beings the capacity to love, he/she gives them the ability to 
help others; thus, God also gives them the capacity to reject love and harm others. Boyd 
(2001:165) states that God cannot protect us from the harm that others might cause us 
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because by God doing so means robbing them of their freedom to choose. Thus, the nature 
of love itself requires that God puts us at risk from each other and thereby makes us morally 
responsible for each other.  
 Moral responsibility is proportionate to the potential to influence others. 
Boyd (2001:170) argues that the higher a creature’s ability for good, the greater it's 
capacity for evil. He states that lower animals have a lesser capacity for love and therefore 
a lower capacity for evil. Human beings have a greater potential to love, therefore a greater 
capacity to do evil. Angels have the greatest capacity to love therefore that greatest 
capacity for evil. Using this principle, Boyd explains why God took such a great risk. The 
greater the good God aims to realise in creation, the greater the evil God risks should 
his/her creation turn against him/her. Thus God is always at risk, not knowing how his/her 
creatures would respond to love. 
 The power to influence is irrevocable  
In this fifth thesis, Boyd argues that God cannot immediately destroy every creature that 
turns to evil. The power of a creature to love or hate has no meaning without time or what 
Boyd (2001:181) calls “temporal duration”. Thus time gives meaning to love, freedom and 
moral responsibility and when God gives his/her creatures the power to choose, God has to 
within limits endure its misuse.  
 The power to influence is finite 
Creatures are by nature finite. Thus their possibilities for choice, actions and influence are 
inherently limited. In the use of our choices we determine the eternal being, we become 
(Boyd, 2001:188). Those who continue to choose evil will eventually give up their freedom 
and as it were become evil itself. Once this has happened, God will no longer allow them 
to influence others.  
Boyd, in dealing with the problem of evil, has diminished the attributes of God. When Boyd 
declares that God takes risks, he attacks the omniscience of God. To move away from putting 
the “blame on God” for the evil, Boyd has created a metaphysical dualism: a war between 
good and evil whose outcome not even God knows because the future is open to God. Thus, 
to consider the theodicy of Boyd one needs to assess the cost of placing several evangelical 
Christian doctrines in jeopardy. 
 
Implications 
The first doctrine to come under attack is the doctrine of creation. Boyd argues that because 
God created creatures with free will, he/she, therefore, cannot act as the continual 
sustenance source. In other words, God has to do nothing for created agents to act. Thus, 
Boyd adopts a form of deism because Boyd’s theodicy depends on the premise that God is 
not involved in our events because free will is supreme: giving creation the power to exit and 
act by itself without any interaction with God. 
The second doctrine to come under attack is God’s foreknowledge. Because God takes a 
risk in creating creatures with free will, not knowing how they will respond to the use of this 
love, Boyd, therefore, denies God’s knowledge of any evil acts. Boyd’s theodicy, therefore, 
requires him to exclude God from also knowing the good actions of will. God cannot foreknow 
any free acts, be they good or evil because free acts are self-determining. Boyd argues 
(2001:57) that we must be able to determine ourselves in relation to God's invitation to use 
our free will for both good and bad acts. Thus, any future acts exist only as indeterminate 
possibilities that no one can know, even God. Therefore, God is as surprised as human 
concerning future events. 
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Boyd understands God as a God who takes risks and adapts his/her plans to changing 
situations. God’s doing so results from the fact that he/she has created human beings as free 
creatures together with the assumption that God cannot know in the future action of human 
beings or the future. Such an understanding of God’s knowledge stands in marked contrast 
to traditional theism, which leads to a completely different understanding of the divine 
attributes. Evangelicals who uphold the inspiration, inerrancy, and infallibility of the Bible must 
search for, develop, and articulate a theodicy that does not deconstruct the traditional view 
of God but must tenaciously preserve the integrity of biblical claims regarding God’s nature 
and attributes. In short, any truly Christian evangelical theodicy must not sacrifice those non-
negotiable elements that define and describe a “Christian Evangelical” position to provide a 
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